aceedburn
1000+ Head-Fier
I’m using the Sandisk Extreme Pro 512GB for my 1A. I can attest that indeed music sounds smoother. Perhaps because of the A2 rating the high definition bigger file sizes get read better. That’s my only explanation for it.
SONY NW-WM1Z / WM1A
- Thread starter leylandi
- Start date
- Status
Final A8000 - no question ask by far one of the fastest and transparent DD that match a Planar Headphone.
AlexCBSN
1000+ Head-Fier
Way more refined mid highs and highs, a bit mods clarity and mp3 does sound way better, less dirty and bit more defined, though even in 16/ 44.1 I can tell the difference right away
Redcarmoose
Headphoneus Supremus
Sony High Resolution Audio Output USB Conversion Cable 5cm WMC-NWH10
Also strangely enough it may be that any Walkman can be a file server to the 1A. Meaning if someone had a 1Z they can put the 1A in DAC mode and play the files in the 1A. It gives even a different sound than a card, more airy. Lol. I could not get the 1Z to act like a DAC for the 1A though?
The other Walkman acts like a card reader. Lol
Though after my last set of posts I may have lost all credibility with this post?
Edit:
I was able to get both the 1A and 1Z to act as sources. The NWH-10 is actually directional so it does not work unless being at the Walkman being used as the source. With that in mind both players can be rotated as DAC or source.
Last edited:
Been reading about this one lately. It it resonated more on my was the sound speed propagation that apparently translates into dynamic range, spaciousness and clarity. I wonder if it is like a Abyss Diana Phi, but in a IEM form factor
Definitely in my list.Been reading about this one lately. It it resonated more on my was the sound speed propagation that apparently translates into dynamic range, spaciousness and clarity. I wonder if it is like a Abyss Diana Phi, but in a IEM form factor
I would say much more close to a Focal Utopia but with more Bass?
aceedburn
1000+ Head-Fier
I have this NWH-10 cable. It only acts as a usb audio output from 1A/Z or any Walkman to an external dac/amp with a usb input. It sounds great paired with my FiiO K5 Pro. It won’t work from Walkman to Walkman unfortunately as it was not designed to work that way.
Sony High Resolution Audio Output USB Conversion Cable 5cm WMC-NWH10
Also strangely enough it may be that any Walkman can be a file server to the 1A. Meaning if someone had a 1Z they can put the 1A in DAC mode and play the files in the 1A. It gives even a different sound than a card, more airy. Lol. I could not get the 1Z to act like a DAC for the 1A though?
The other Walkman acts like a card reader. Lol
Though after my last set of posts I may have lost all credibility with this post?
Location can use GPS, Wifi., Cellular - A-GPS ( https://www.diffen.com/difference/A-GPS_vs_GPS ),
GPS and A-GPS or the more common usages.
Also, the level of exposure depends on whether the "black" apps running on your device are:
a) using the location for the radio transmitters you are actually connecting to for WiFi/Cell, or
b) whether it is more devious, and complex, and using the actual scanning of those signals, without needing to be connected to them. (more complex and less likely)
- GPS is the most accurate, followed by A-GPS which has relatively static cell towers and databases with their location. WiFi is pretty random, as they are added and moved, and thus not easy to have a reliable database.
- Bluetooth would only see which BT users are close to you. This by itself does not provide location information. Again, if the "black" app was able to then search for other BT users close to you, and search for their connection to Cell towers, etc., then there is a way to "locate" you. This is very unlikely, but not impossible.
So for the Sony DAP, what needs to be considered:
- does not have GPS, so this cannot be used for location
- WiFi - not on the WM1x , and not so easy to use for tracking, even when present on a device.
- Cell connection or scanning - not on the device
- BT - extremely low risk
- Apps - you cannot install any. And you should not be installing any, even if they are available from an App store, or could be sideloaded.
- Streaming - Not on the WM1x DAPs. This is a risk, as it connects to the network/outside world. For your concerns, this should absolutely not be used, even if available.
Bottom line, the music only devices like the WM1x that use a proprietory OS (not IOS, Android, etc.) are the safest devices you will find for your concerns.
For extra security, run them in a "sandbox", totally isolated from the network/world. (same holds for IOS/Android devices)
1. use airplane mode if available. (This is assuming that airplane mode does actually turn off all radios, and does not enable them under some circumstances.)
- Manually make sure all radios are turned off. WiFi, Bluetooth, Cellular, NFC
- Edit: do not use BT earphones. Only use wired earphones
2. more paranoid, put your device in a faraday cage/pouch. This is one provider: https://faradaybag.com/
Get a big one, and insert your hand into the pouch to change tracks, volume. Leave it in the bag as much as possible.
Or maybe you are willing to take the risk and use it outside of the pouch while you are adjusting the track/volume
3. even more paranoid, get somebody to physically disable all radios inside the device, so that all it can do is play locally stored music.
BTW, one real world usage of faraday pouches is to use one for your Car keyless dongle. It is very easy to steal a car from the driveway by amplifying the signal of these keyless fobs that are sitting inside a house, by the front door, and start your car and drive away. This is being reported from many places. The Amplifiers are available online, and quite cheap.
Last edited:
Redcarmoose
Headphoneus Supremus
Nope it does work. I would be happy to show a cell phone video where you can see the 1A recognition of the 1Z and it going into DAC mode.
It may only work with another Walkman? But I would be happy to prove it.
The only entity that could theoretically track a wm1a/z device through a Bluetooth function would be a government agency conducting dragnet surveillance.
Say your player was individually identified as having been paired with your phone, or had already been identified through a PC connection. theoretically it would be possible to locate it if it was visible to other devices in public, or was intercepted by Bluetooth interception devices.
An excerpt from an article I found
David Starobinski, a BU College of Engineering professor of electrical and computer engineering, and a team of researchers have discovered a vulnerability in several high-profile Bluetooth devices—including the popular workout-tracking Fitbit watch—that could allow third parties to obtain sensitive information from the devices, such as your whereabouts and activities.
“We were looking into different IoT protocols in general and trying to find privacy issues with those products,” says Johannes Becker, a BU graduate researcher on the team. “Basically everybody is carrying around a Bluetooth device nowadays in some way, shape, or form, and that makes it very relevant.”
Starobinski says that the very same features that allow a device to “authenticate,” or correctly identify, its user—e.g., saved paired device information or a fingerprint passcode—can be co-opted by a third party to track the person instead.
“We were looking at different ways we could try to authenticate people,” says Starobinski. “One of the ideas was that you carry all these devices and they have specific behavior features, [so] maybe we can use them. And it’s interesting because there’s kind of a trade-off. On the one hand, you can authenticate because you have these unique signatures of your devices. But on the other hand, you also have the issue that the same feature can be used by a third party to track you. So, it’s a double-edged sword.”
The researchers say that the information leak stems from the way different Bluetooth devices communicate with one another to establish a connection.
Before a pair of Bluetooth devices can begin transmitting information, they must first establish which device will play a central role in the connection and which device will play a peripheral role. For example, if you were trying to connect a pair of Bluetooth headphones to your iPhone, the iPhone would play the role of the central device and the headphones would be the peripheral one, says Becker. Once the pair’s hierarchy is established, the central device begins scanning for signals sent by the peripheral device that indicate it’s available for connection. These signals contain a unique address—similar to the IP address of a computer—and a payload containing data about the connection.
Most devices produce randomized addresses that automatically reconfigure periodically, instead of maintaining one permanent address, in an attempt to improve privacy. It’s designed to throw nefarious observers off the scent of a given device’s location, but Starobinski’s team says that they discovered an oversight in this process that allows a device to be tracked even as its address changes.
“To an onlooker [the payload data] could just be a number, no big deal,” says Becker. “But we said, ‘Let’s take this random data…and let’s pretend it’s a unique identifier [of the device].’ And then what we found is that this [identifier] doesn’t change in sync with the address.”
https://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/fitbit-bluetooth-vulnerability/
Say your player was individually identified as having been paired with your phone, or had already been identified through a PC connection. theoretically it would be possible to locate it if it was visible to other devices in public, or was intercepted by Bluetooth interception devices.
An excerpt from an article I found
David Starobinski, a BU College of Engineering professor of electrical and computer engineering, and a team of researchers have discovered a vulnerability in several high-profile Bluetooth devices—including the popular workout-tracking Fitbit watch—that could allow third parties to obtain sensitive information from the devices, such as your whereabouts and activities.
“We were looking into different IoT protocols in general and trying to find privacy issues with those products,” says Johannes Becker, a BU graduate researcher on the team. “Basically everybody is carrying around a Bluetooth device nowadays in some way, shape, or form, and that makes it very relevant.”
Starobinski says that the very same features that allow a device to “authenticate,” or correctly identify, its user—e.g., saved paired device information or a fingerprint passcode—can be co-opted by a third party to track the person instead.
“We were looking at different ways we could try to authenticate people,” says Starobinski. “One of the ideas was that you carry all these devices and they have specific behavior features, [so] maybe we can use them. And it’s interesting because there’s kind of a trade-off. On the one hand, you can authenticate because you have these unique signatures of your devices. But on the other hand, you also have the issue that the same feature can be used by a third party to track you. So, it’s a double-edged sword.”
The researchers say that the information leak stems from the way different Bluetooth devices communicate with one another to establish a connection.
Before a pair of Bluetooth devices can begin transmitting information, they must first establish which device will play a central role in the connection and which device will play a peripheral role. For example, if you were trying to connect a pair of Bluetooth headphones to your iPhone, the iPhone would play the role of the central device and the headphones would be the peripheral one, says Becker. Once the pair’s hierarchy is established, the central device begins scanning for signals sent by the peripheral device that indicate it’s available for connection. These signals contain a unique address—similar to the IP address of a computer—and a payload containing data about the connection.
Most devices produce randomized addresses that automatically reconfigure periodically, instead of maintaining one permanent address, in an attempt to improve privacy. It’s designed to throw nefarious observers off the scent of a given device’s location, but Starobinski’s team says that they discovered an oversight in this process that allows a device to be tracked even as its address changes.
“To an onlooker [the payload data] could just be a number, no big deal,” says Becker. “But we said, ‘Let’s take this random data…and let’s pretend it’s a unique identifier [of the device].’ And then what we found is that this [identifier] doesn’t change in sync with the address.”
https://www.bu.edu/articles/2019/fitbit-bluetooth-vulnerability/
Last edited:
aceedburn
1000+ Head-Fier
I see. Well if it does work I stand corrected then. Never knew it did. But what’s the point in that anyway?
KurobaHeiji
New Head-Fier
I just ordered a D8000 pro yesterday.
Sonywalkmanuser
Headphoneus Supremus
Well there's nothing in my walkman that is worth tracking unless the hacker is interesting in my crappy lossy AAC music collection, he is free to take.
Sonywalkmanuser
Headphoneus Supremus
The lexar 633X which I mentioned with bad sound quality is also A2 rated. Anyway to make use of A2 increased IOPs, the source device also needs to be compatible with the new Native Command Queueing system which I don't think the 2016 WM1A has support for.
I would think that Sandisk has better nand designs with more cleverly designed read/write microcontroller units. The extreme pro series is designed for professional photographers in mind where photos stored on the microsd is very important and cannot be lost, so this sandisk card has much better power and heat management, better error correction, wear leveling and quality nand as compared to the rest of their series. I would think the extreme pro are going to be as good as industrial grade microsd cards in engineering quality less the wider temperature operations.
Last edited:
What amplifier will you use with them?
- Status
Users who are viewing this thread
