[Head_case]

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Originally Posted by jonathanjong /img/forum/go_quote.gif 1. My point is that epistemologists are right to spend lots of time on method, even if they shouldn't spend all their time worrying about it. Analogously, philosophers of biology are right to spend lots of time on evolution, even if they shouldn't spend all their time worry about it.

The problem with the philosophical foundation of biology, is that it still trades on speculative thought, and propositions evolutionary theory as a science. Are you satisfied with the method of scientific induction, based on premises, which require extensive (and atheoretical extrapolation), in order to 'make the theory' work? Empirical foundations for observational data like natural selection are valid; however interpreting sense-data (observed) into a speculative framework like evolutionary theory, is not science per se. Philosophically speaking, there are too many contentions in the false premises of evolutionary theory to make it satisfying as an example to affirm this point. I would prefer you choose Alexander Fleming's petri dish trials with the fungus from which Penicillin was derived. The empirical foundations for his sense-data observations, are eminently ...empirical. This kind of modern empirical science I can recognise with no difficulty. However hybridising [speculative thought on a theory of origin] with modern science, is a different enterprise altogether.

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2. Don't you mean split rather than spilt?

Do I have to spit it out....?


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3. The dancing is enjoyable; this is the thing about continental philosophers I love the most. My friends in that tradition take it all much less seriously, it's more fun. But then, of course, as was pointed out, there are a whole lot of dogmatic continentals too.

What else is there? The danger of presupposing a logical system of knowing, extends to a systematic worldview with completeness as its ultimate goal. This kind of epistemology is irrelevant when we deal with existential themes: thought is not Being: knowing is not Being: there can be no 'existential system of Being' - this is a rubbish premise in itself. 'Being' risks being rubbished in the tradition of analytical philosophy. This is why, it is safer for monists to use obsessional defences and cling onto methodology, rather than move beyond their zones of knowing, into the mystery of Being.

In general, continental philosophers accede to the impossiblity of knowing Being and are more humble for it [rather than reducing 'Being' to some impoverished concept or 'thought']. They refuse to accept the reduction of Being into either polar theory of monism [idealism vs materialism]: the discourse and language of the continental philosopher shifts, precisely because a logical system of knowing, which extends its knowing to a systematised Weltanschauung, aims for completeness as its project: this would swallow Being. That is - Being is reduced to bite sized chunks of not-being anymore. Whereas there can be a logical system of epistemology [knowing/thought]; thought is not existence; existence is not thought, and anyone who claims this to be, is as schizoid as Descartes, failing to recognise the fullness of life, of which 'thought' is a part of.

I've written this twice, so that it's easier to get around listening to a head case

No existential system of philosophy is possible: the terminology of the reductionists is useless when dealing with the philosophy of Being: all you can do, is dance around Being, or retreat back into the philosophy of non-being.

Anyway - do tell us which particular continental philosophers you are referring to

 

[viggen]

"Don't think; feel. It's like a finger pointing away to the moon. Don't concentrate on the finger, or you will miss all the heavenly glory." Bruce Lee in Enter The Dragon (1974)

I am a big fan of Descarte. I am not very well read in regards to philosophy. But, Descartes seems to have started questioning things before it was fashionable to do so. And, he did so in a away that expanded human thinking during a time when it was forbidden to do so.

Along the same lines, I would think Buddha was such a person. But, I don't think a single original thought from Buddha the man, the philosopher really survived the millennias. Not that I looked for it.

 

[jonathanjong]

1. Oh dear, Head_Case, I expected more from you re: science. Surely you've not forgotten that all observations are theory-laden; surely you've not forgotten the problem of induction; surely you're familiar with failed quest for a principle of demarcation between science and non-science. Have you forgotten Popper? Science is all about bold conjectures and attempts at refutation! There will always be under-determination of theory by data. But an empirically under-determined theory is not a non-scientific theory! If so, there would be no scientific theories at all!

2. Hehe. Spit. Split. Spilt. You might have to clarify, I'm afraid. I'm rather thick.

3. It's this talk of Being that perplexes us. Not sure what that's all about. What's the question? And what are the proposed answers? What are the arguments? Etc.

4. My worst experiences have been with Heidegger and Derrida; I didn't find Neitzsche and Kierkegaard as frustrating; I've just started reading some Foucault and Riceour, and that seems to be readable so far.

 

[evilking]

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Originally Posted by evilking /img/forum/go_quote.gif There are no stars in the universe, but there is one in that universe... EK

If you rearrange the letters of "that universe" you get one "star", but no combination of letters from "the universe" will give any stars...

Although, the universe does have much to offer. There are rune thieves, sieve hunters, this revenue, sith revenue, **** revenue, tushie nerves... even her suit!

EK

 

[Head_case]

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Originally Posted by jonathanjong /img/forum/go_quote.gif 1. Oh dear, Head_Case, I expected more from you re: science. Surely you've not forgotten that all observations are theory-laden; surely you've not forgotten the problem of induction; surely you're familiar with failed quest for a principle of demarcation between science and non-science.

Lol! Still doing the Freudian Ego posturing?! You need to expect more from yourself; not me. Read again:

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Are you satisfied with the method of scientific induction, based on premises, which require extensive (and atheoretical extrapolation), in order to 'make the theory' work? Empirical foundations for observational data like natural selection are valid; however interpreting sense-data (observed) into a speculative framework like evolutionary theory, is not science per se. Philosophically speaking, there are too many contentions in the false premises of evolutionary theory to make it satisfying as an example to affirm this point. I would prefer you choose Alexander Fleming's petri dish trials with the fungus from which Penicillin was derived. The empirical foundations for his sense-data observations, are eminently ...empirical. This kind of modern empirical science I can recognise with no difficulty. However hybridising [speculative thought on a theory of origin] with modern science, is a different enterprise altogether.

If you cannot distinguish the empirical method of the 'randomised controlled trial' used by Alexander Fleming as I've stated above, and the quasi-philosophical science like evolutionary theory, which can not be tested empirically in this method, then you are no scientist at all.

Back to philosophy:
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Have you forgotten Popper? Science is all about bold conjectures and attempts at refutation! There will always be under-determination of theory by data. But an empirically under-determined theory is not a non-scientific theory! If so, there would be no scientific theories at all!

Your premise then, is that a Grand Narrative, like Evolutionary Theory, can be formulated as science. Popper is irrelevant when it comes to the falsifiability of 'the Grand Narrative'. Many like you, will attempt to locate evolution, as if speculative theory was indeed, reliant on the hypothetico-deductive method. In which case, you have clearly not been versed in Midgeley's philosophical objections to the false and non-scientific premises of evolutionary theory.

Simply put: you quote Popper (whose theory in the field of science is relevant). Your presupposition is that evolutionary theory shares all the characteristics of other sciences, including applied sciences, like medicine; immunology, microbiology; all of which have a valid empirical basis and have saved countless lives. Eugenics, a branch and outgrowth of evolutionary theory, however has not. That's a distraction, however the onus then, is on demonstrating, whether the tenets of evolutionary theory, are equal to these sciences; similar in form, or merely aspiring to be, yet in the final analysis, is not. Such mimicry in philosophy or science deserves no place at all.

Popper's view of Darwinism as a non-testable scientific theory, but as a form of pseudo-philosophical and Victorian quasi-metaphysical project occupies a strange place, between non-science and speculative thought: its philosophical foundations are as creaky as the best of non-empirical and soft sciences.

But let's be honest Jonathan; does any of this dialogue aim towards dialogue and Truth, or is the Freudian explanation of what is going on here on these pages, sufficient?

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2. Hehe. Spit. Split. Spilt. You might have to clarify, I'm afraid. I'm rather thick.

Answer: Ambiguity. Language must be constructed if words are to become more than conceptual forms of knowing; words can inform. Earlier you discovered this:

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1. We're using "liberal" in related ways: You for a philosophical tradition, me for the society it's produced.

The 'hermeneutic of suspicion' - one of our favourite phenomenologists' methods at decoding and unmasking what is said to us; relies on suspending the faculty of self-critical judgement: if our hearts are closed - what use will our head be in making sense of something else stated by another i.e. at cross-purposes? The hermeneutic of suspicion involves more than just a conceptual tool; it requires a realignment of one's way of seeing problems: maybe this is why for Gadamer, it can extend beyond horizons ... your horizon of understanding...my horizon too.....towards a fusion of horizons; maybe this is why for Ricoeur; interpretation along the lines of this methodology, leads to pluralistic interpretations, all enriching - one another, reified and expansive, destined for plurality of the 'word'. Is this not the nature of the Logos from Antiquity? It was always destined for plurality; to be extended and used in tongues unnumbered - 'Word' was destined to find itself in metaphor; allegory; anaphor; an expansion of our horizon in which we could use 'language as meaning'; 'language' as an anchor against any monism; or any warped version of the subject-object dualism. Language could be used ... to edify. Is that permissible to state here? Not to use language as a divisive tool, to close down meaning. Certainly not ...for trying to cut others down too.

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3. It's this talk of Being that perplexes us. Not sure what that's all about. What's the question? And what are the proposed answers? What are the arguments? Etc.

The most fundamental question you can think of - return to Antiquity.

What is Being? How can you know Being? Does Being change? Does man ever step in the same river twice? Is Being a single Being, or multiple states of Being? Such premises can be found with Aristotlean thought. You can research the arguments in his problems of the universe and explore Ontology in Thomas Aquinas and the medieval philosophical schools. Without this chronological axis, attempting to understand the philosophy of Being, by reading Nietzsche or late 18th century solitary writers, lead too much to a dilettante approach towards existentialism, instead of recognition of the rich heritage aggregated through history. The danger then, is that Ontology risks being lost and the question of Being, becomes insensible to the questioner.

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4. My worst experiences have been with Heidegger and Derrida; I didn't find Neitzsche and Kierkegaard as frustrating; I've just started reading some Foucault and Riceour, and that seems to be readable so far.

Heidegger's Being and Time is very dense! I don't read German fluently and that probably doesn't help, however his introductory lecture notes to philosophy are more tangible, yet equally, far from 'lucid'. Simone Weil's Lecture Notes on Philosophy' are worthwhile discovering for a refreshing clarity and innervation towards appreciating philosophy.

You can be forgiven for thinking poorly of Derrida, as most in the analytical tradition deride him for obscure and obfuscating language. Remember however, that Derrida plays with text; the reader cannot assume that he is a passive receptacle, waiting to be spoonfed. Derrida requires working through the density of his text; I find his scepticism interesting, however recall that the skeptics' position drew closer to truth, than the phlogiston believers.....and there is sufficient reason to maintain a healthy scepticism without becoming enslaved by temptation into its paralysis. Kierkegaard's work is very clear for the dialectically minded, however can become so pedantic and agonisingly painstaking to move from one idea to another; he simply won't let go and keeps on twisting and turning ideas with a perspicacity which is ultimately illuminating. His originality and density of language is something which Derrida could only hope to aspire to.

If you wish to move beyond the confines of the analytical tradition, the Habermas' Communicative Rationality' which locates reason in terms of dialogue (i.e. the language created between me and you) might be worth trying. This is contrary to the orthodox and tired views of reason being located in some form of individual mental masturbation, practiced alone; practiced often, but ultimately, out-of-dialogue.

The clearest and most straightforward account of existentialism I could recommend is the terse and short 'The Philosophy of Existentialism' by Gabriel Marcel. 'Being and Having' is an incredible and profound incision into the human condition in the 20th century as a meditation on the existential themes of man whereas 'Metaphysical Journal' is probably only worthwhile recommending to the sincere and earnest who are on their own philosophical journey and willing to go beyond the confines of traditional philosophy.

 

[nealric]

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My worst experiences have been with Heidegger

Lol, I had a horrible experience with Heidegger in college.

My college has a bit of a special relationship with Heidegger because a professor there was actually assigned to guard Heidegger after he was captured in WWII. The professor later helped produce the first English translations of Heidegger's work. As a result, the entire philosophy department (save one or two) was made up of Heideggarians.

In the first class I have that discusses Heidegger (20th century continental), the prof assigns a collection of his lectures that have sentences every other page glorifying the Nazi party. It didn't help that he was one of the very few major philosopher's I've read whose writing was so opaque that I was sorely tempted to declare that the emperor has no clothes (only other one I can think of is Whitehead).

 

[jonathanjong]

At work, so will only respond to the science stuff:

All scientific hypotheses and theories are unfalsifiable. cf. Lakatos. "Grand" theories like Darwin's or Einstein's (or previously Newton's or Copernicus's) are just collections of hypotheses/theories. I don't see why we should distinguish between "scientific" theories and "metaphysical" theories, really. Both are falsifiable and unfalsifiable in the same way.

On the rest: I've been recommended Weil and Habermas recently, actually. Will check out for sure.

 

[catachresis]

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Originally Posted by viggen /img/forum/go_quote.gif "Don't think; feel. It's like a finger pointing away to the moon. Don't concentrate on the finger, or you will miss all the heavenly glory." Bruce Lee in Enter The Dragon (1974)

Enlightenment is like the moon reflected on the water. The moon does not get wet, nor is the water broken. Although its light is wide and great, the moon is reflected even in a puddle an inch wide. The whole moon and the entire sky are reflected in dewdrops on the grass, or even in one drop of water. -Dogen
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Along the same lines, I would think Buddha was such a person. But, I don't think a single original thought from Buddha the man, the philosopher really survived the millennias. Not that I looked for it.

Huh-errrm. Why, if I wanted to say something that sounded authentically Zen Buddhist, I might aver that given that you're not looking for it, you'll surely find it.

 

[Head_case]

I often wonder why it is, that many read Husserl's research assistant - Heidegger - but not Husserl, yet don't go on to read Heidegger's research assistant - Edith Stein.

Heidegger's extreme versions of ontology and his relationship with totalitarianism echoes an earlier precept: how can we divorce word from action, when taking our lead from a philosopher's mind? Who are we, to think that we can take their word as it is, without looking at the actions to account for their word? Any inconsistency between (conceptual) thought and being (in action) is a model of human behaviour.

I'm thankful I never had to study Whitehead. I would lose mine. What is left of it.

 

[Head_case]

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Originally Posted by jonathanjong /img/forum/go_quote.gif A All scientific hypotheses and theories are unfalsifiable. cf. Lakatos.

So is Astrology. So are dragons. So are deities. So are doopledongbogglegangers.

All you are then saying, is that quoting Popper then, gets you nowhere, as far as epistemic issues go. If this is the outcome by following Popper's thought, then his theory lacks the heuristics to be philosophically useful. Resting in this state of surrender and knowing more or less 'jackzhit' by following this line of thinking, is not epistemology: it is fatalism and lazy philosophy. Or a surrender of thinking, to another man's limited methodology, instead of engaging in one's own. ('inauthentic')


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"Grand" theories like Darwin's or Einstein's (or previously Newton's or Copernicus's) are just collections of hypotheses/theories.

Oh dear.

Copernicus was an astute scientist and observer: does the earth not revolve around the sun? Is this just a 'collection of hypotheses or a theory'? The earth moves nonetheless.....

Again - you seem to confuse Darwinism with evolution; or conflate Darwinian theory on a par with Einstein's Theory and Copernician findings, and worse, of all, end up denouncing Copernicus' First Revolution in the revolutions of all scientific paradigms - a denouncement which cannot stand in the face of ...scientific evidence - overwhelming, dare I say. Can you show me an alternative to the Copernician which is valid? The Aristotlean world view of the planetary system was abolished....thanks to Copernicus.

I'll not differentiate Copernician observational data from Darwinian observational data: both are data-collection projects; observational data which I'm very happy to accept as different forms of science; one being astronomy; the other being taxonomy.

So let me start of with a few crude premises for you:

1. Evolution is true.
2. Natural selection is true
3. Evolution uses natural selection as a mechanism.

4. There is insufficient time to observe evolution in action
5. Evolution requires a long time to take place
6. Therefore the earth must be x billion years old
7. Since evolution uses natural selection and there is a long timescale for it
to act, it is possible for fish to turn into men.
8. We observe micro-variation between moths like Biston Betularia.
9. This micro-variation (change of colour) can be called micro-evolution, if and only if, one transmutates into the other.
10. Based on no. 9, no.7. must be true.
11. Based on no. 9 and no. 7, the fossil record can be explained.

No.4 - No.11 all have Fawlty Towers logic implicit. Can you see this? Or do I need to spell it out....

Would you like to comment on these premises? Oh look - maybe you already have:

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I don't see why we should distinguish between "scientific" theories and "metaphysical" theories, really. Both are falsifiable and unfalsifiable in the same way.

Think of a castle in the air perhaps? If you can see a castle, without a foundation, is it really a castle? Or is it an illusion? If you have no metanarrative around Grand Narratives, is there truly, philosophical activity involved in the Grand Narrative? If you have no metaphysics in science; what exactly is this kind of science?

The gauntlet can be thrown down like this: if you believe that you cannot or should not distinguish between scientific theories and metaphysical theories; you conflate both; do neither justice, and may, as GK Chesterton states; believe in not nothing - but anything.

What is the difference then between astrology and evolution if the above quote is a set of premises which you hold true?

Your 'explanatory' power for distinguishing, between truth and fiction ... is lacking in heuristic potential. There is a limit to the use of Popper's theory, and the criteria of falsifiability. The world has moved on; we know too much; we know too little: we don't know the difference between what we do know, and what we can't know.

Maybe it's time to 'Phone a Friend'?!

 

[nealric]

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6. Therefore the earth must be x billion years old

Science does not arrive at the age of the earth based on evolution (or life at all). Estimates are based on geology and cosmology.

 

[Head_case]

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That premise is clearly and demonstrably false. There is plenty of time to observe natural selection for individual traits in organisms that reproduce quickly.

The premise is indeed false (as are plenty of others listed above). But not for the reason you have quoted:

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Take antibiotic resistance in bacteria. You can put bacteria in a petri dish, introduce antibiotics, and let the survivors reproduce. After a few generations, lo-and behold, the bacteria will have evolved a resistance to that particular antibiotic.

You cite this as evidence of evolution, yet we have not defined the limits of this 'word' 'evolution. Let me guard against 'defining evolution' into being through a syllogism or through linguistic substitution then:

In a bacterium, there is an organelle called a 'plasmid'. Plasmids are present in all bacteria; their function of which, is to exchange genetic material with other bacteria. Biologists use the word 'evolve' very loosely here, and one of the problems about having a weak metaphysical basis for their science, is that it imputes circular thinking or syllogistic type reasoning, which is indefensible. We cannot use the word 'evolve' or 'evolution' to signify 'change'. Otherwise your $.01 will be proof of evolution in your pocket. (j/k btw). We observe change i.e. metamorphosis, puberty - but to name two processes: neither are examples of evolution.

The exchange of verbal information between male and female Head-Fi.org users - is this 'evolution'? What about the exchange of genetic material?

Naughty naughty! Stop thinking dirty things lol!

In both cases; neither examples demonstrate 'evolution'. The first, is called 'communication'; the latter, is called sexual reproduction.

Bacterial plasmid activity function as exchanges: the fact that bacteria can 'mutate' by exchanging plasmid activity; plasmid activity has been observed as a functional part of the bacterial organelles in all bacteria; revision of susceptibility of one's resistance to things is not indicative of evolution. The bacteria change their resistance; of course they change! Being changes too; Being is always in flux! We change all the time: we do not call this 'evolution' in our own lifetimes.

But does changing 'bacterial resistance' equate to changing the bacterial 'identity'?

A more rigorous example of 'evolution' then needs to be sought. This is not it.

In any event, 'mutation' signifying 'change', is insubstantial: the bacterium, remains ... a bacterium. It does not evolve, into a fish or a human. Bacterium: the principle of identity remains.

When the principle of identity is violated, then you can consider 'evolution' to have taken place. If indeed, the conditions are such, that it 'evolves' for the better, and not 'evolves for the worse', as observed in 99% of all known mutations (in this case, 'evolutionary theory', is anti-empirical, and relies on that 1% chance for its propositions to become true).

Firstly, you need to demonstrate that micro-evolution (small changes in identity) take place and are sufficient to give rise to a new identity.
Secondly, you need to demonstrate, that these micro-evolutionary changes (no.8), when aggregated, can be postulated reasonably to extrapolation, so that we can get from fish to a man (condition no. 7)

I'm waiting all ears. All paws, or whatever else my thoughts might mutate me into whilst waiting

 

[jonathanjong]

I read Stein!

Saying that we can't distinguish between scientific and metaphysical theories doesn't mean that we can believe in anything. Let's see.

We rejected Ptolemaic astronomy, because Copernicus's explanation of the phenomena was more elegant, less ad hoc. Also, it generated novel hypotheses which turned out to be true.

We rejected Newtonian physics, because Einsteinian physics could explain observations that Newtonians failed too. The movement of Mercery's perihelion had been a thorn in Newton's side of a while now, and no attempts to explain the data away (e.g., unobserved planets, like in the Uranus-Neptune incident) had worked.

We rejected phlogiston theory, because oxygen theory's explanation of the burning of calxes did not require belief in counterintuitive propositions (e.g., phlogiston has negative mass).

We rejected Creationism, likewise, because evolutionary biology provides a more elegant, parsimonious explanation of biological phenomena.

Now, it's important to note when we DIDN'T reject Ptolemy, Phlogiston, and Creationism. They had problems for long before Copernicus, Lavoiser, and Darwin came along. As Kuhn and Lakatos point out, there had to be a new, better theory to replace these old, problematic ones. So, empirical problems – "falsifications" – do not kill theories, contra naive-Popperianism, cf. Duhem-Quine thesis. Scientific theories aren't falsifiable in this way.

What about metaphysical theories? Take...the mind-body problem, for example. Traditionally, dualism won because it was more explanatorily powerful than physicalism. But physicalism is catching up, and dualism generates its own set of problems (e.g., the interaction problem). But physicalists might never be able to explain some phenomena (e.g., consciousness). This is just analogous to the "scientific" debates of the past.

In conclusion, no, we are not left to believe nothing or anything. We can test out theories – scientific or metaphysical – and we can come to conclusions, if only tentative ones.

 

[jonathanjong]

Does this principle of identity talk commit the fallacy of thinking that species are natural kinds? Just wondering.

 

[nealric]

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Bacterial plasmid activity function as exchanges: the fact that bacteria can 'mutate' by exchanging plasmid activity; is not indicative of evolution. They change; of course they change! Being changes too; Being is always in flux! We change all the time: we do not call this 'evolution' in our own lifetimes.

Note: I deleted my earlier post because I reread yours and noticed you mentioned micro-evolution,etc.

But there is a clear difference between change within one's lifetime and an evolved genetic trait. If the antibiotic resistant bacteria reproduce in the future, their offspring will continue to be antibiotic resistant. If I develop a resistance to a poison by continuous low-dose exposure, my children won't also be resistant to the poison.

Your concept of identity poses an unnecessary metaphysical question. Biology doesn't care at what point Bacteria A has become Bacteria B. Those were just names we used for our own understanding of the organism. We could just as easily define Bacteria A as that bacteria which is not antibiotic resistant and bacteria B as that which is. The point is that a genetic trait has become dominant through natural selection.

So the actual reasoning is: We can observe a limited number of traits changing and being passed on through national selection over an observable mount of time. Given more time, it is likely that more changes could be observed. It is therefore likely that given sufficient time, a very large number of traits could be passed on through natural selection.